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Chapter 24
Animals
gary hatfield
Descartes notoriously proposed that (non-human) animals are mere machines, devoid 
of sensation or feeling. This proposal, which in itself seems ludicrous, becomes intelli-
gible when seen within Descartes’s larger philosophical scheme. In this scheme, sensa-
tion and feeling can arise only in a mind: an immaterial substance, distinct from matter. 
For various reasons, Descartes denied minds to animals, and, on that basis, he denied 
them feeling.
In the body of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy and theology that 
informed Descartes’s philosophy, most thinkers considered the divide between non-
human and human animals to be large and signifi cant. Most philosophers held that 
only the human animal is rational, self-refl ective, and free to deliberate and choose. 
They viewed non-human animals as possessing sentience and some simple cognitive 
abilities, but as unable to entertain universal notions (such as the concept of animal, 
which applies to all animals) or to represent cognitively anything except concrete, 
particular bodies. Theologically, most held that, while the human soul is immortal, 
other animals either lack a soul or have a soul that perishes with the body. Descartes 
reinforced the metaphysical divide between humans and other animals. He upheld the 
immortality of the human soul, and he argued that, if other animals had souls, they 
too would be immortal – a theologically heterodox consequence that he rejected, there-
fore denying souls to animals.
Nonetheless, animals are like human beings in that they are alive, they eat and drink 
to maintain their bodies, they have sense organs, and they move. Many earlier thinkers 
explained such commonalities by attributing a lower form of soul, an animal soul, to 
both human and non-human animals. Plato held that this common animal soul 
explains sentience in humans and animals alike, and that humans additionally have 
an intellectual soul. Aristotle and his medieval followers held that human and animal 
souls share the vegetative (or vital) powers of nutrition, growth, and reproduction and 
the sensitive powers of sensation and movement, but that only the human soul has the 
power of reason or intellect.
Given that Descartes denied any sort of soul to animals, his other philosophical com-
mitments entailed that he must explain the vital and sensitive powers of non-human 
animals through purely material causes. Indeed, he welcomed this task, for he was 
engaged in the larger project of providing purely mechanistic explanations for all 
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natural phenomena of the material world. Animal bodies form functional unities that 
are adapted to environmental circumstances and that maintain themselves by eating 
and drinking when they need to. Earlier thinkers invoked animal souls to explain such 
functional unity and goal-seeking behavior. In his new physics, Descartes sought to 
discover or hypothesize material mechanisms that would explain the physiological and 
behavioral capacities of animals, including how they maintain themselves by seeking 
food and drink, reproduce themselves, and modify their behavior to fi t current circum-
stances. Metaphysically, his new perspective raised the problem of accounting for the 
functional unity of the animal body considered as a purely material construction, 
devoid of an active, organizing power such as the sensitive soul.
Descartes’s project becomes even more challenging if we ask whence come such 
mechanisms that are capable of performing the functions of living things. Offi cially, 
Descartes endorsed the accepted theological orthodoxy, that God designed and created 
the bodily mechanisms of humans and animals. However, in his natural philosophy he 
set himself the task of explaining the origin of animals as part of the natural develop-
ment of the universe out of an original chaotic soup of material particles. Within this 
naturalistic perspective, he must explain how, through purely material processes, the 
functionally organized bodies of living things (plants and animals) could be produced 
from non-living matter. Without a designing creator, how do animal bodies arise that 
are capable of digesting food, growing, reproducing, and performing the behaviors 
needed to preserve life and health?
This chapter considers philosophical problems concerning non-human (and some-
times human) animals, including their metaphysical, physical, and moral status, their 
origin, what makes them alive, their functional organization, and the basis of their 
sensitive and cognitive capacities. I proceed by assuming what most of Descartes’s fol-
lowers and interpreters have held: that Descartes proposed that animals lack sentience, 
feeling, and genuinely cognitive representations of things. However, some scholars 
interpret Descartes differently, denying that he excluded sentience, feeling, and repre-
sentation from animals, and I will consider the evidence for these interpretations as 
well. Finally, hereafter, when I use the word “animal” without further qualifi cation, it 
means non-human animal.
Status of Animals
Among ancient Greek philosophers, Plato accorded a modicum of reason to animals, 
and Aristotle denied them reason. Thomas Aquinas, the single most important phi-
losopher among medieval Christian theologians, codifi ed this denial. He drew the impli-
cation – which Augustine of Hippo, the most important Christian theologian of late 
antiquity, had only suggested – that only the human animal has an immortal soul 
(Sorabji 1993). Aquinas thereby placed humankind on the frontier between worldly 
and divine. Human beings are linked to the animal world through their bodily capaci-
ties, but they are similar to angels and analogous to God through their immaterial, 
hence immortal, souls.
Aquinas’s philosophical argument for the special status of humankind drew upon 
the Aristotelian account of the vital and cognitive faculties of plants, animals, and 
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human beings, which attributed differing kinds of souls to each: vegetative souls to 
plants; sensitive souls to animals; but rational souls to human beings alone. Just as the 
sensitive soul of animals also incorporates the vegetative powers (nutrition, growth, 
and reproduction), the human rational soul incorporates both these and the sensitive 
(sensory and motor) powers as well. The higher, rational, powers unique to humans 
include intellection and voluntary action, or free will (Thomas Aquinas 1964–81: 
I.76.4, 79.1). Following a hint in Aristotle, Aquinas argued that the vegetative and 
sensitive souls are intrinsically united to corporeal organs in their operation and that 
they therefore perish with the body of the plant or animal (Sorabji 1993: 201). By 
contrast, the rational power of the human soul operates independently of any bodily 
organ (even if, for the human soul to think during this life, it must use the faculty of 
imagination, which does require a corporeal organ, in the brain) (Hatfi eld 1998: 954–
61). Accordingly, the rational soul is deemed to be immaterial and immortal. This 
generalized Aristotelian account of animal and human souls and their powers and 
status was widely held in Descartes’s time (e.g., Dupleix 1990: 521–652; Eustachius a 
Sancto Paulo 1998: 83–92).
Augustine and Aquinas held a further thesis about the relation between humans 
and animals: that animals are created for the use of humankind, and so may be killed 
and eaten (Sorabji 1993: 198). The metaphysical divide between rational and non-
rational, together with this view about God’s providential aims, rendered animals as 
means toward human ends.
There were dissenters regarding the cognitive and moral divide between humans 
and animals. The ancient atomists, Epicurus and Lucretius, argued that all minds are 
purely material, formed from subtle matter, that is, from very fi ne material atoms in 
the bodies of human and non-human animals (Lucretius 1994: 71–2). These atoms 
possess only the qualities of shape, size, motion, and weight (pp. 45–6). Sensation arises 
when groups of atoms – shaped as images, in the case of vision – enter the sense organs 
and brain. Thought occurs when images interact with the subtle matter of the mind 
(pp. 113–16).
In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes developed a similar position. He agreed 
that sensation involves nothing other than bare interactions between the matter inside 
and outside sentient bodies, and he also restricted the content of thought to images. 
Accordingly, he recognized no intrinsic, metaphysical distinction between human and 
animal cognition: human thought is a function of the faculty of imagination – a faculty 
that theorists generally, Aquinas included, agreed is common to humans and animals. 
Hobbes explained the human capacity for reasoning as arising through the acquisition 
of language. By providing a range of distinguishable symbols, language increases the 
power of the imagination for thinking (Hatfi eld 1998: 972–5).
In the century prior to Descartes and Hobbes, Michel de Montaigne (1965) argued 
that humans are not different in kind from animals, either morally or cognitively. His 
arguments drew upon a range of literature, with frequent reference to Lucretius. In 
effect, he denied any metaphysical distinction between humans and animals, whether 
founded on supposed differences in rationality or in moral standing.
Descartes widened and reconceived the gap between animals and human beings. 
He viewed Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s theories as accounting for human souls by adding 
a new power –  that of reason – to the animal soul (3:62; AT 1:415). By contrast, 
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Descartes rejected the animal soul. Thus arose the task (which he coveted) of explaining 
the capacities of both human and animal bodies through confi gurations of deanimated 
matter: matter devoid of any properties except shape, size, position, and motion. He 
continued to place human beings on the border between the material world and the 
divine: they have bodies, but they also have immaterial minds. As he saw things, 
thought and feeling are functions of an unextended, immaterial, thinking substance. 
But, further, since he viewed feeling as a function of thought, if animals had souls that 
felt, they would exhibit signs of thought (1:140–1; AT 6:58–9; 3:374; AT 5:345).
In his Discourse on the Method, Descartes proposed two criteria to prove that animals 
show no signs of thought, and indeed “have no reason at all” (1:140; AT 6:58). He 
described animals as purely material bodies, which he labeled as “machines” due to 
their intricate organization. He then contended that, although such machines might 
exhibit all the behaviors characteristic of animals, two aspects of their behavior would 
reveal that they lack minds. First, “they could never use words, or put together other 
signs, as we do in order to declare our thoughts to others” (1:140; AT 6:56). Parrots 
and magpies can pronounce words that sound like human language, but they do not 
exhibit the behavior that indicates genuine speech: “they cannot show that they are 
thinking what they are saying” (1:140; AT 6:57). Second, although mindless machines 
might do some things better than can human beings (as bees do in building a honey-
comb), they would fail at many other tasks. This shows that their skill derives from 
innate mechanisms rather than from reason, because “reason is a universal instrument 
which can be used in all kinds of situations” (1:140; AT 6:57). If animals possessed 
reason, they would show the same sort of general problem-solving abilities as do human 
beings.
Descartes claims that these arguments reveal the profound gap between animals and 
humans: “when we know how much the beasts differ from us, we understand much 
better the arguments which prove that our soul is of a nature entirely independent of 
the body, and consequently that it is not bound to die with it” (1:141; AT 6:59). As did 
Aquinas, he concluded that reason is an immaterial power, so that the possession of 
reason proves that the human soul is capable of surviving the body. Unlike Aquinas, 
Descartes refused to countenance a vegetative or sensory soul. In his Treatise on Man, 
which he composed in the early 1630s and described in the Discourse (of 1637), he 
asserts that his animal machines could perform vital and sensitive functions without 
“any vegetative or sensitive soul” (1:108; AT 11:202). This was, in effect, to deny that 
animals possess any sentience at all, on the assumption that matter by itself is in-
capable of feeling (3:98–100; AT 2:38–41).
A few years later, in a letter to his chief correspondent, Marin Mersenne, Descartes 
clarifi ed the relation between sentience and the human (or “rational”) soul. He con-
ceded that animals might exhibit the kind of behavior that we exhibit when we feel 
pain, but he contended that they do not actually feel pain, because they have no 
minds:
I do not explain the feeling of pain without reference to the soul. For in my view pain exists 
only in the understanding. What I do explain is all the external movements which accom-
pany this feeling in us; in animals it is these movements alone which occur, and not pain 
in the strict sense. (June 11, 1640; 3:148; AT 3:85, 11)
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Animals, we can infer, possess no faculty of “understanding” and so no soul or mind; 
hence, they feel no pain. (On Descartes’s equation of the immaterial soul with mind, 
see 2:114, 246; AT 7:161, 356.)
By making sentience depend on the understanding, Descartes deviates from the 
Aristotelian position and leaves no room for an animal soul that lacks reason and 
understanding but still possesses sentience. In the Meditations, Descartes elaborated his 
theory of mind in a way that illuminates this connection between sentience and under-
standing. Matter is a spatially extended and unthinking substance, and mind is an 
unextended and thinking substance (2:54; AT 7:78). They share no properties: matter 
can’t think, and thoughts (or the mind that thinks them) are not extended. Further, 
the one essential property of thinking substance is intellect or understanding. Sensory 
perception and consciousness depend on the intellectual attribute of thinking sub-
stance (2:54–5, 113, 382; AT 7:79, 160, 559). Thinking substance also has a faculty 
of volition, that is, of willing; willing is a sort of thought, or thought-activity (2:19; AT 
7:28; 1:204; AT 8A:17).
Descartes’s theory therefore marks two further differences between human beings 
and animals, beyond language use and general reasoning: human beings have sen-
tience and consciousness, animals do not; human beings exercise will, animals do not. 
The denial of will to animals was commonplace. Aquinas spoke of animal “appetite” 
rather than will (1964–81: I.81.3); for him, such appetite involved sentience and 
feeling.
Finally, Descartes did not endorse the usual notion that animals were created for 
human use. He did not deny it outright, but he contended that we could never know 
it, because we are unable to discern God’s ends. For the latter reason, he generally 
banished from natural philosophy the search for “fi nal causes” (2:39; AT 7:55): “it 
would be the height of presumption if we were to imagine that all things were created 
by God for our benefi t alone, or even to suppose that the power of our minds can grasp 
the ends which he set before himself in creating the universe” (1:248; AT 8A:81). He 
allowed that, ethically, it may be “an act of piety to assert that God made everything 
for our benefi t”; but, to assume “in the study of physics” that “all things were in fact 
made for our benefi t, in the sense that they have no other use,” would be “utterly 
ridiculous and inept,” since “many things exist, or once existed, though they are here 
no longer, which have never been seen or thought of by any man, and have never been 
of any use to anyone” (1:248–9; AT 8A:81).
Origins of Animals
Common medieval and early modern explanations of how living things (plants and 
animals) reproduce have them arising through the propagation of “seeds” or from the 
mixing of seminal fl uids. In the Aristotelian scheme, male animals provide the “form” 
of the living thing (the animal soul), female animals the “matter.” According to Aquinas 
and his followers, God infuses the rational soul in human animals when the embryo 
has reached an appropriate stage of development (Roger 1997: 49, 72).
Such a process might explain the origin of individual animals, but how did the fi rst 
male and female parents arise? Augustine, Aquinas, and other Christian theologians 
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believed that God designed and created original pairs of plants and animals, from which 
subsequent living things have descended through the usual processes of reproduction. 
However, special creation and sexual reproduction were not the only going accounts 
of the origins of (at least some) plants and animals. Many thinkers, including Christian 
thinkers, held that, after creation, some plants and even some animals, such as insects 
or worms, arise through spontaneous generation (Roger 1997: 61). When conditions 
are right in rotting meat, mud, or dead wood, fl ies or worms may come forth. Indeed, 
Lucretius held that spontaneous generation could even explain the origin of the fi rst 
plants and animals: they were born of the Earth in an earlier age when its crust was 
hotter and wetter.
Lucretius envisioned an account of the formation of the heavens, earth, plants, and 
animals from the chance conglomeration of atoms in the void. The atoms, which 
naturally fall downward (recall that these atoms have weight, in addition to shape, size, 
and motion), are diverted from their uniform falling when some of them, on some occa-
sions, inexplicably “swerve” (1994: 43). The resulting collisions among particles led to 
the formation of the heavens and Earth. Over time, the atoms variously combine; 
indeed, they “have come together in every possible way and tested everything that 
could be formed by their combination” (p. 139). Among these combinations were living 
things. Once the Earth had formed, it spontaneously produced plants (p. 148). 
Subsequently, it brought forth all the animals, including human beings, through a 
process that still sometimes occurs:
Even now multitudes of animals are formed out of the earth with the aid of showers and 
the sun’s genial warmth. So it would not have been surprising if more and bigger ones had 
taken shape and developed in those days, when earth and ether were young. (p. 149)
Processes similar to those that (ostensibly) now cause spontaneous generation brought 
forth all the animal kinds in an earlier age. Birds were formed fi rst; then, as there was 
“a great superfl uit of heat and moisture in the soil,” there formed “wombs, clinging to 
the earth by roots.” These wombs brought forth mammals who were suckled by Earthly 
extrusions of “a juice resembling milk.” Indeed, “here is further proof that the name of 
mother has rightly been bestowed on the earth, since it brought forth the human race 
and gave birth to every beast that runs wild among the high hills” (p. 149).
Descartes knew Lucretius’ work well enough to attempt to quote it from memory 
(3:63; AT 1:417). In his post-student days in Holland (1618–19), he studied atomism 
(and mathematics) with Isaac Beeckman (AT 10:67–8). In 1619–20, he started a 
notebook entry named “Democritica,” after the ancient atomist Democritus (AT 10:8). 
In this early period, he was enthralled by the atomist picture, and may, in atomist 
fashion, have considered the soul as subtle matter, like wind or fi re (1:5; AT 10:218; 
2:17; AT 7:26). He later rejected atomism in favor of corpuscularism (the view that 
matter is infi nitely divisible, where atoms are indivisible), and he adopted a view that 
the soul or mind is immaterial. Nonetheless, for the material world he reinterpreted and 
developed the atomist cosmogony in corpuscular terms.
Descartes described the formation of the solar system and Earth in two major works, 
the Principles of Philosophy and the earlier World, or Treatise on Light. In both works, he 
nominally endorsed the “doctrine of Christian faith,” that the Earth and its plants and 
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animals were created by God just as they are now (1:256; AT 8A:99–100; also 1:90, 
99; AT 11:32, 120). Nonetheless, within natural philosophy he considered it more 
useful to develop (“hypothetically,” he said) an account in which God’s role is limited 
to creating the material soup of moving particles from which a world like ours arises. 
He wrote in the Principles:
if we want to understand the nature of plants or of men, it is much better to consider how 
they can gradually grow from seeds than to consider how they were created by God at the 
very beginning of the world. Thus we may be able to think up certain very simple and 
easily known principles which can serve, as it were, as the seeds from which we can dem-
onstrate that the stars, earth and indeed everything we observe in this visible world could 
have sprung. (1:256; AT 8A:100)
He begins with the hypothesis that God has created bare, extended matter that forms 
a plenum of particles of various sizes; he imparts to these particles a certain quantity of 
motion that he keeps constant as it is transferred among the particles in accordance 
with his three laws of motion (1:240–3; AT 8A:61–6). Descartes describes how, out of 
this soup, suns and planetary systems form, how continents and mountains form on 
the Earth, and how minerals form.
How plants and animals form should come next, yet Descartes does not cover this 
topic in either the Principles or the World. But he was working on it. In the Discourse, 
describing the as yet unpublished World, he encourages us to believe that, from matter 
in motion, “all purely material things could in the course of time have come to be just 
as we now see them” (1:133–4; AT 6:45). He then implies that he had already provided 
an account of the formation of plants in the World, but that animals and human beings 
had stymied him:
From the description of inanimate bodies and plants I went on to describe animals, and in 
particular men. But I did not yet have suffi cient knowledge to speak of them in the same 
manner as I did of the other things – that is, by demonstrating effects from causes and 
showing from what seeds and in what manner nature must produce them. (1:134; AT 
6:45)
The part of the work in which he described the formation of plants has not survived 
(assuming he actually wrote it); he continued to develop, but never published, his 
account of the generation of animals.
In 1639, Descartes wrote to Mersenne that “the number and the orderly arrange-
ment of the nerves, veins, bones and other parts of an animal do not show that nature 
is insuffi cient to form them, provided you suppose that in everything nature acts exactly 
in accordance with the laws of mechanics” (3:134; AT 2:525). Having previously 
excluded the generation of animals from his World because it would “take me too long” 
to explain (3:39; AT 1:254), he now boasts that he “can explain it all in detail, just as 
in my Meteorology I explained the origin of a grain of salt or a crystal of snow,” saying 
that if he were starting his World over, he would include this explanation (3:134–5; 
AT 2:525). Ten years later, he expressed dissatisfaction with his explanation of the 
“formation” of animals, but, although discouraged, he believed that he could fi nish it 
and his entire physics, given the needed time and experiments (AT 5:261).
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If Descartes did not achieve a satisfactory account of how animals might arise natu-
rally out of the chaos, it was not for want of trying. In some of his early recorded 
thoughts on generation (both spontaneous and through mating), he sketched the basic 
process as starting from the circular fl owing of subtle matter (spirits and blood) that 
heat has enlivened; this fl owing matter presses particles together to form tubular struc-
tures and closed sacs, eventually accruing an entire body (AT 11:505–6). The same 
process might form animals spontaneously in nature: “so little is required to make an 
animal, it is really not surprising that we see so many animals, so many worms, so 
many insects spontaneously forming in all putrefi ed matter” (AT 11:506). In January 
1648, as he composed the portion of his Description of the Human Body on generation, 
he retained the basic conception: procreative generation results when the seminal 
fl uids from male and female form a kind of intrauterine vortex, through which various 
organs and limbs are produced (1:321–4; AT 11:252–7). In his conversation with 
Burman at this time (3:349; AT 5:168–9), he also made clear that he considered the 
account of creation in Genesis to be metaphorical. We may therefore take Descartes to 
have believed that plants, animals, and human bodies really were formed naturally as 
the cosmos developed, just as animal bodies are now formed naturally through material 
interactions in procreation.
Life, Health, and Function
Plants, animals, and human beings exhibit the traditional marks of life: nutrition, 
growth, and reproduction. Further, animals have sense organs and motor apparatus 
that allow them to seek nutrients, avoid harms, and locate benefi ts. Descartes acknowl-
edged that these phenomena are displayed by living things. He contended that all these 
phenomena could be explained mechanistically, by the “disposition” or “arrangement” 
of plant or animal organs, just as the behavior of a clock is explained by its “counter-
weights and wheels” or its “wheels and springs” (1:108; AT 11:202; 1:139–41; AT 
6:55–9). Further, he held that the same mechanisms can explain how animals behave 
so as to approach what is benefi cial and avoid what is harmful to their bodies (Descartes 
1998: 163; AT 11:193, 519).
The dominant explanation of these phenomena in Descartes’s time invoked 
Aristotelian teleology. A teleological explanation appeals to aims or ends or outcomes 
in explaining a process. Plants and animals incorporate nutrients so that their bodies 
will grow and sustain themselves, they mate in order to reproduce, they avoid harm and 
seek benefi t in order to preserve their bodies. In Aristotelian terms, the development, 
maintenance, and reproduction of the plant or animal is the end or “fi nal cause” of the 
plant’s or animal’s vegetative soul or power; and the preservation and reproduction of 
the animal is the fi nal cause of the animal’s sensitive soul (Aristotle 1984: 661). 
Christian theologians such as Aquinas adapted the notion that lower souls pursue ends 
or fi nal causes to their conception of the world as created. Thus, on their view plants 
and animals seek to live and reproduce because God found it good to make things that 
have those ends (Thomas Aquinas 1964–81: I.44.4, 47.1, 77.3). Here, the notion of 
an end or fi nal cause has both an external aspect (God as creator, who orders things 
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according to his goodness) and an internal aspect (God creates things which themselves 
have Aristotelian internal ends).
As noted above, Descartes sought to banish from natural philosophy any appeal to 
God’s ends. He also banished vegetative and sensitive souls, and hence he precluded 
explaining the self-preserving behavior of plants and animals in terms of fi nal causes 
that are embedded in such souls. In the material world, he permitted causation only 
through the impact of bodies (large or small) on other bodies. Unlike Aristotelian 
physics, there are no “forms” embodying fi nal causes through which they order and 
direct the motions of even inanimate things.
Did Descartes, then, remove all fi nal causes from the world? In fact, no. As many 
scholars have observed (e.g., Laporte 1928; Simmons 2001), Descartes himself appealed 
to teleology and fi nal causes in the Meditations. He describes God’s ends in setting up 
the mind-brain relation: God sought to align sensations with brain states so that the 
sensations would best contribute to “the preservation of the healthy man” (2:60; AT 
7:87). God made the mental feeling of thirst a generally reliable indicator that we 
should drink, and he arranged that the sensations of the external senses generally lead 
us toward what is benefi cial and away from what is harmful to the body (2:56; AT 
7:81).
So far, Descartes has invoked teleology only in God’s ends regarding the mind-brain 
relation. Descartes also used teleological talk in describing the parts of the body (Hatfi eld 
1992: 361), when he spoke of the “functions” or “uses” of those parts. These include 
the generic functions usually associated with the vegetative soul (nutrition, growth, 
and reproduction), as well as more specifi c functions, such as alterations in the blood 
to make it suitable for nourishing the body or for producing the spirits in the brain 
(1:108; AT 11:202; 1:318; AT 11:244, trans. alt.). Are these functions a product of 
God’s designing intentions and creative acts? Descartes affi rms so in passages already 
cited. Some scholars (e.g., Garrett 1999) have therefore urged that he allowed fi nal 
causes and teleology only in God’s creative acts (as well as in the purposes of human 
agents). And yet Descartes also offers a cosmogony in which plants and animals arise 
out of the chaos, without special creation. In that case, what becomes of his talk of 
functions? Can the notion that an animal’s parts cooperate to preserve the animal’s 
health be explained in a natural cosmogony?
To answer these questions, we need to disentangle various notions of teleology, to 
see which Descartes did or could endorse. In doing so, we should keep in mind why 
Descartes would want to avoid fi nal causes in nature. Apart from acknowledging that 
minds act for purposes, Descartes would fi nd unintelligible any case in which some-
thing that hasn’t happened yet (a future “end state”), or in which something that 
is not in contact with a body (a distant “end state”), is able to infl uence the motion 
of a body.
First, we should distinguish external from internal fi nal causes. An external fi nal 
cause would come from a designer or creator; it exhibits external teleology because the 
ends are fi xed externally. If I build a mousetrap, I design it with a structure that will 
achieve a desired outcome. My desire to catch mice fi xes the end and so determines the 
function of the trap. Similarly, if God thinks it good to adjust our sensations to our 
nervous systems, then his external intention fi xes the function of those sensations (to 
preserve the body). In the traditional picture, according to which God designs animal 
c24.indd   412 6/7/2007   6:24:06 PM
animals
E
413
bodies, the functions of their parts would be fi xed externally. Descartes offers a different 
picture, in which a world like ours arises without God directly fashioning its parts. In 
Descartes’s naturalistic cosmogony, God institutes laws of motion that produce a “quite 
perfect world” (1:91; AT 11:35); these laws depend on God’s will (1:92; AT 11:36; 
2:294; AT 7:435–6), and in choosing the laws, God would also choose the type of world 
they would produce. However, that world and the things in it arise out of an initial 
soup of particles, which might have been totally chaotic (a random ordering: 1:257; 
AT 8A:101–3). Hence, God does not initially arrange the particles so that, through 
Laplacean determinism, they unfold in a fi xed causal sequence that leads to our world. 
Rather, our world emerges through natural processes. This suggests that, even if God 
foresees the outcome, natural processes must create the organized entities in the world, 
from solar systems and mountains to plant and animal bodies. Let us see if these 
processes sustain a notion of internal fi nal cause, or immanent teleology.
Internal fi nal causes are immanent to the thing that acts. We can distinguish two 
sorts of immanent teleology: those in which the end-state directly causes the behavior 
(“end-state caused”), and those in which a previous tendency to produce a certain end-
state causes a type of thing or a type of mechanism to exist now (“end-state selected”). 
In the end-state caused case, the end or goal causally infl uences the body. This sort of 
fi nal causation is possible for minded beings: the end state of crossing the street, as 
represented in my mind, causes me to direct my legs in a certain manner. Aristotelians 
posited this type of causality even in unthinking matter, for they held that the motion 
of the element “earth” is directed toward the center of the universe. The element moves 
toward the center by its own power, without any intermediary such as a force of attrac-
tion – and in this way the round globe of Earth is formed. Descartes restricts this type 
of end-state caused fi nality to thinking beings, rejecting the Aristotelian version in 
unthinking matter (or incorrectly accusing the Aristotelians of positing little souls 
in matter that know where to go: 2:298; AT 7:442; 3:216; AT 3:648).
In the case of end-state selected fi nality, a type of thing or mechanism exists (or 
continues to exist) because it regularly achieves a certain outcome (Wright 1973). 
Cases of end-state selection can be divided into two classes. In the fi rst class, a thing 
exists because its designer or creator foresaw (or perhaps merely believed) that it 
would achieve a certain effect. Here, we have both external and internal fi nality. 
The designer chooses the effect, but the thing has the function of bringing it about. 
I make the mousetrap, but it exists because of what it can do (or what I think it can 
do). Therefore, the mousetrap itself has the function (immanent end) of catching mice. 
In the second class, natural processes “select” a thing because of what it can do. 
Through the random operation of natural causes, a thing or mechanism arises that 
has a certain effect: for example, an animal that can run faster in avoiding predators 
than do others of its type. The faster animal continues in existence (reproduces itself), 
whereas the slower ones get caught and so don’t reproduce. There is no external 
teleology, since the selection process occurs blindly, with no end; and yet this process 
produces things that serve an end. This sort of end-state selection occurs in Darwinian 
natural selection, according to which variants of a biological trait are selected because 
they contribute to the survival of a given type of animal. Hearts exist because they 
pump blood. Their immanent end is pumping, because they have been blindly selected 
for doing that.
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The internal teleology of the functional operations of animals, including growth, 
reproduction, pursuit of benefi ts, and avoidance of harms, might be explained if 
Descartes held that God designed the mechanisms that promote these life-functions; 
here, external teleology would fi x internal teleology. However, since Descartes 
wanted to formulate a cosmogony in which plants and animals arise naturally from 
the chaos, he needs a mechanism for ends-selection that can sustain his talk about 
function.
Although he did not describe such a mechanism, a description was available to him. 
Lucretius not only posited that the various species originally arose through spontane-
ous generation, but also speculated that many more types of animal were produced 
than exist today. Among the products of spontaneous generation would be “monstrous 
and misshapen births,” such as “mouthless brutes,” or animals “disabled by the adhe-
sion of their limbs to the body, so that they could neither do anything nor go anywhere 
nor keep out of harm’s way nor take what they needed.” Nature “debarred” them from 
increase because they couldn’t feed and perhaps couldn’t couple in procreation (1994: 
150). Other erstwhile species, although capable of feeding and procreation, would die 
out through competition:
Every species that you now see drawing the breath of life has been protected and preserved 
from the beginning of the world either by cunning or by courage or by speed. In addition, 
there are many that survive under human protection because their usefulness has 
commended them to our care. (Ibid.)
The lion lives by courage, the fox by cunning, the stag by fl ight, the dog through human 
care. By contrast, other species have faced extinction:
Those that were gifted with none of these natural assets, unable either to live on their own 
resources or to make any contribution to human welfare, in return for which we might 
let their race feed in safety under our guardianship – all these, trapped in the toils of their 
own destiny, were fair game and easy prey for others, till nature brought their race to 
extinction. (p. 151)
Here, then, is a mechanism of end-state selection that might explain the occurrence of 
organisms that exhibit immanent teleology. Lucretius, who rejected teleology of the 
sort I have called “external” (pp. 116–17), provided a mechanism by which types of 
organisms are selected, and their descendants exist, because of the functioning of their 
parts. Although he did not overtly describe the organs of the surviving species as pos-
sessing immanent teleology, he spoke (p. 116) of their “use” (a term connoting func-
tion), and he described a mechanism of selection that would support ascriptions of 
immanent teleology. (Although Lucretius’ position is generically similar to Darwinian 
natural selection, he did not envision that later species evolve from earlier ones by 
selection on heritable variations; he has all species arise at once, with differences among 
them existing already, and some then die out through selection processes.)
Descartes’s extant writings include passages that describe the formation of the solar 
system and Earth and also the spontaneous generation of animals. He promises, but 
does not deliver, an account of the original formation of plants and animals. Descartes 
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repeats the Lucretian notion that over time the matter of the universe will combine “in 
every possible way” (Lucretius 1994: 133, 139), subject to his own laws of nature: “by 
the operation of these laws matter must successively assume all the forms of which it 
is capable; and, if we consider these forms in order, we will eventually be able to arrive 
at the form which characterizes the universe in its present state” (1:258; AT 8A:103). 
Thus, although there is no direct evidence that Descartes posited ends-selection, the 
mechanism fi ts his naturalistic cosmogony, as the above excerpts from Lucretius give 
witness. (Descartes also supposed that solar systems arise naturally, but he did not 
apply functional terminology to such systems – presumably because he accepted the 
traditional view that the parts of living things show a special unity and integrity of 
function, such that notions like health and disease apply to them, but not to solar 
systems.)
Let us grant that ends-selection could account for immanent teleology within 
Descartes’s chaotic cosmogony, and let us assume that Descartes would want to treat 
his function statements as instances of immanent teleology. That would provide him 
with a basis for ascribing functions to plant and animal organs that have wholly 
natural origins. We must still face a further metaphysical challenge, which questions 
whether Descartes can accommodate the functional unity of the animal machine 
within his metaphysics. The idea of ends-selection tacitly assumes that types of organ-
isms, with heritable structures, form recognizable natural kinds that possess organic 
integrity. Two considerations militate against this assumption in Descartes’s natural 
philosophy.
First, as several scholars have noted (Laporte 1928: 389; Des Chene 2001: 135), in 
the Meditations Descartes appears to deny the reality of the notion of bodily well func-
tioning as applied to the human body considered as a natural thing. Focusing on the 
bodily machine itself (apart from its relation to mind), he observes that a description of 
it as working improperly (when it is ill) is a mere “extraneous label” (2:59; AT 7:85). 
He compares this description to that of a broken clock, implying that the property of 
the clock’s being broken is not metaphysically real, because the alleged defect obtains 
only in relation to the time-keeping purposes of makers and users of clocks (external 
teleology).
This fi rst problem, that animal bodies should not be assigned functional integrity 
apart from external purposes, lacks a certain plausibility. On the assumption that 
God is the designer of the human body (which Descartes publicly affi rmed), the notion 
that being ill and deviating from his intended design is “merely” extraneous seems 
odd: surely God’s design could fi x the internal ends of bodily mechanisms. But perhaps 
Descartes did not wish to put great weight on the design hypothesis (Descartes 
2000: 65; AT 11:524). There is still a reason to doubt the cogency of his classifying a 
description of the body’s proper functioning as a merely extraneous label, for he held 
that death is constituted by the fact that the body becomes disordered or broken 
(1:314–15, 329–30; AT 11:225, 330–1). To say that being broken has no genuine 
reality in this case would be to assign a tenuous status to death itself, even though, 
for Descartes, death has the metaphysical consequence that the mind quits 
the body. Presumably, the mind quits the body because it detects the fact that the 
body is broken. Since the mind does not itself direct (or even understand) the body’s 
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functioning, there should be a brute natural fact of brokenness to which the mind 
responds at death. (A second response would treat well functioning as a physical, 
rather than metaphysical fact, per my discussion of the second problem.)
Second, scholars have objected that Descartes could not have a notion of immanent 
teleology because in his system animal bodies are not proper substances (Laporte 1928: 
391–4) and do not form natural kinds (Des Chene 2001: 116). Apart from God, there 
are only two sorts of substance for Descartes: minds and body. Minds exist as separate 
individuals. The objection proceeds by supposing that Descartes held, or should have 
held (Grene 1985: 100–1), that all matter everywhere constitutes a single substance; 
what we call individual bodies are merely provisional collections of particles within the 
one material substance. If that is so, only substances have genuine metaphysical stand-
ing. Then animal bodies, like all individual bodies, are merely notional entities – that 
is, a mere product of the ways that humans divide up and classify the world for their 
own practical purposes.
For some metaphysical purposes, the functional organization of a body and its exis-
tence as an entity may be merely “extraneous” and notional. However, that need not 
prevent our construing animal bodies as properly unifi ed entities for the purposes of 
Descartes’s physics or natural philosophy. The objection that individual bodies and types 
of body have a tenuous metaphysical status would also apply to various kinds of things 
that Descartes places at the center of his natural philosophy, including his notion of a 
“particle” (a piece of the one material substance) and the three kinds of matter he 
describes in the Principles (defi ned by the size and shape of particles). It would also apply 
to the various kinds of material things he examines in his natural philosophy: vortexes, 
suns, planets, magnets, minerals, metals, and so on. Perhaps, strictly speaking, vor-
texes, magnets, and salt are not metaphysically real kinds in Descartes’s metaphysics. 
But Descartes found that in natural philosophy, the properties of salt can be studied, 
outlined, and discussed, even if salt is a relatively late product of the processes through 
which the crust of the Earth and the oceans are formed (AT 8A:220–32).
Within his natural philosophy, Descartes believed that from his fi rst principles – 
particles moving according to the laws of motion – he could deduce a priori (that is, 
from their causes) the basic constituents of the world: the basic kinds of particles, the 
formation of vortexes, stars, light, and planets; and even, in his ambitious moments, 
the formation of water, air, fi re, and minerals (1:144; AT 6:64). Other, more particular 
things, including perhaps steel and magnets (AT 8A:281–7), cannot be derived a priori: 
we must collect their properties from natural history (through observation). Plants and 
animal bodies surely belong in this latter class. But that needn’t diminish their claims 
to physical kindhood. For, if only matter itself has a substantial essence or nature, then 
no physical kinds, whether derivable a priori or not, are metaphysical kinds.
When Descartes assigned a single essence – extension – to the entire material world, 
he made a revolutionary departure from Aristotelian natural philosophy. Consequently, 
he needed to retheorize the notion of a natural kind within his own natural philosophy. 
Metaphysically, he described extension as the “nature and essence” of material sub-
stance (1:210; AT 8A:25), which is consistent with there being only one substantial 
natural kind in the material world (extended matter). But he also speaks of the “natures” 
of various kinds of bodies: air, water, the Earth’s interior, quicksilver, magnets (1:271–
6; AT 8A:231–79), plants, animals, and man (1:186; AT 9B:14). He thus employed a 
c24.indd   416 6/7/2007   6:24:06 PM
animals
E
417
double usage of the term “nature.” The second usage suggests that, in his physical 
scheme, magnets, plants, and animals are real physical kinds.
Metaphysically, these kinds lack a substantial nature that would be peculiar to each 
of them. They certainly do not have Aristotelian natures: substantial forms that govern 
their activity and that individuate them as kinds in Aristotle’s physics. Descartes, 
however, proposes a counterpart to Aristotelian natures. Having observed that changes 
in the one extended matter arise only through motion, he updates the notion of a cor-
poreal nature:
any variation in matter or diversity in its many forms depends on motion. This seems 
to have been widely recognized by philosophers, since they have stated that nature is 
the principle of motion and rest. And what they meant by “nature” in this context is 
what causes all corporeal things to take on the characteristics of which we are aware in 
experience. (1:232–3; AT 8A:53)
Descartes suggests that a nature is a confi guration of matter in motion that produces 
a standard set of effects, including the variety of corporeal things and their character-
istics. A natural kind would then be such a confi guration that exists in many instances. 
In Descartes’s world, this means that a natural kind arises through regular processes 
out of the chaos or from the subsequent stable patterns that develop. Perhaps that is 
reality enough for physical kinds and for functionally organized bodies in Descartes’s 
system.
Sense and Cognition
Animals engage in behaviors that are similar to those that humans engage in when 
we have sensory experience (3:99, 303, 365; AT 2:39, 4:574, 5:276). They respond 
differentially to light, sound, and other sensory stimulation: a dog may cry when struck 
or cringe at a loud noise. Animals can be trained to act differently than usual: to cringe 
at the sound of a violin (3:20; AT 1:134), or to remain still when partridges fl y and not 
to fl ee at a gunshot, but instead to retrieve a dead partridge on command (1:348; AT 
11:370). More generally, animals seek what is benefi cial and avoid what is harmful 
(AT 11:519).
These animal abilities were granted by all, including Descartes. During the seven-
teenth century, there was an ongoing debate about how to explain them.
Prior to Descartes, philosophers who denied reason to animals usually did not deny 
them sentience and cognition, or (sometimes) knowledge. Although Aristotle had 
restricted animal cognition to sense perception, the Arabic commentator Ibn-Sina pro-
posed that animals should be granted a special cognitive power, the “estimative faculty,” 
to explain how animals grasp properties that are not proper to any one sense: as when 
the sheep perceives that the wolf is an enemy, even though being an enemy is not a 
specifi cally visual property. Aquinas accepted the estimative faculty, and it became 
common doctrine concerning the sensitive soul (Sorabji 1993: 64). Before Descartes’s 
animal-machine hypothesis became known, seventeenth-century authors were agreed 
that animals possess cognitive powers. They debated whether to call these powers 
c24.indd   417 6/7/2007   6:24:06 PM
gary hatfi eld
E1
418
“knowledge,” and whether these powers constitute a limited form of rationality that 
did not require immateriality and so did not portend immortality (e.g., La Chambre 
1989).
Descartes altered all such debates by applying his animal-machine hypothesis to the 
control and direction of behavior. He argued, on both metaphysical and scientifi c 
grounds, that although animals exhibit complex behaviors, they are unfeeling 
machines.
Metaphysically, his new system led him to regard sensation as intrinsically intel-
lectual. The mind’s properties all derive from the two chief forms of thought, intellection 
and will (1:204; AT 8A:17). Intellection includes sensation, imagination, and pure 
intellect (the ability to understand without contemplating images). The will includes 
desire, doubt, and affi rming or denying. Sensation and memory, as well as earthly pas-
sions and desires, depend on the union and interaction of mind and body, but the 
mental effect in these sensations or emotions is a mode of intellection. Hence, if animals 
are denied intellect, they are denied sensation.
Descartes’s new conception of matter as possessing only the geometrically describ-
able properties of shape, size, position, and motion was even more radical in the seven-
teenth century than his new conception of mind, for it deanimated matter, debarring 
active principles, Aristotelian substantial forms, and Aristotelian real qualities from it 
(Henry 1997: 59–70). Aristotelians considered the souls of beasts to be substantial 
forms. If Descartes could fi nd a reason to reject such forms, he would have an argument 
for denying Aristotelian sensitive souls to animals.
Descartes offered both metaphysical and natural philosophical arguments to support 
his denial of substantial forms (and animal souls). The metaphysical arguments pur-
porting to establish that extension is the essence of matter are well known. He also 
offered natural philosophical (or physical) arguments for corpuscularism, based upon 
its intelligibility and parsimony (Hatfi eld 1985: 151–6). The arguments from intelligi-
bility are found in the World (1:90–1; AT 11:33) and the Discourse (1:132; AT 6:42–3); 
those from parsimony, in the Meteorology (Descartes 1965: 268; AT 6:239) and letter 
to Morin (3:107; AT 2:200). Descartes did not claim that these arguments refute the 
doctrine of substantial forms; rather, they show that he can explain all natural phe-
nomena without appealing to such notions.
That is just what Descartes claims to do in the Treatise: to explain all the functions 
of animals – including sense-guided behavior and the pursuit of benefi cial and the 
avoidance of harmful objects – through mechanical causes alone. He would not require 
“any vegetative or sensitive soul or other principle of movement and life, apart from its 
blood and its spirits, which are agitated by the heat of a fi re burning continuously in 
its heart – a fi re which has the same nature as all the fi res that occur in inanimate 
bodies” (1:108; AT 11:202). In effect, Descartes imagines a hydraulic machine in 
which innate structures (“instincts”: Descartes 1998: 163; AT 11:192), sensory stim-
ulation, and internal states of the organism (such as lack of food: Descartes 1998: 164; 
AT 11:194–5) direct the fl ow of animal spirits to the muscles so as to produce appropri-
ate behavior.
Descartes here claims to be able to explain mechanistically the offi ces of the sensitive 
soul, including those that Aristotelians explained by invoking cognitive powers. 
He uses a combination of instinct and associative memory to account for the chief 
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psychological capacities in animals: sensory and motor response, associative learning 
(which might explain training), and situationally appropriate behavior. If his explana-
tions test out, he could then press the comparative intelligibility of his basic principles 
(arrangements and motions of particles possessing only shape and size) and the parsi-
mony of his explanations (material corpuscles alone, as opposed to myriad substantial 
forms, one for each type of plant and animal).
He has admitted that his natural philosophical arguments do not prove that substan-
tial forms are not real, and hence that animals lack sensitive souls. He merely claims 
to provide simpler and more intelligible explanations than those which invoke such 
entities. His metaphysical arguments were supposed to take up the slack. In the 
Meditations (2:44, 54; AT 7:63, 78) and Principles (1:210; AT 8A:25), he claimed to 
establish that matter has only the properties of shape, size, position, and motion. This 
fi nding was meant to exclude from purely material things all substantial forms (which 
are active principles), real qualities (including the Aristotelian primary qualities of hot, 
cold, wet, and dry, which Descartes must now explain solely through extended matter 
in motion), and thought, including sensation.
Descartes’s metaphysical argument for excluding animal souls invokes these prem-
ises: if animals have sentience, they must have minds; hence, they must exhibit intellect 
and reason, but they don’t. His argument is, of course, subject to challenge. First, one 
might ask why animals should be denied reason. I examined Descartes’s arguments for 
this conclusion in an earlier section.
Second, one might ask why there couldn’t be minds that are merely sentient. This 
challenge suggests that animals might be assigned a lesser form of soul or mind, capable 
of sentience and limited cognition but lacking the resources for language use and 
general intelligence. Metaphysically, Descartes’s reason for excluding this as a possibil-
ity stems from his purported direct insight that intellection is the one essential property 
of mind, which means that all minds must always have it. He further claimed that, if 
animals were given diminished minds, these would still have to be immaterial and 
hence immortal, an outcome he rejected on metaphysical and theological grounds 
(2:287; AT 7:426; 3:304; AT 4:576; 3:366; AT 5:277). He also held that the faculty 
of will is essentially infi nite (2:40; AT 7:58), which entails that, if animal minds had 
wills, those wills would of necessity be as free as the human will, which he and his 
audience would have found implausible.
The third challenge asks why matter can’t produce sentience, or even thought. 
Descartes might respond by denying that matter, or material states, are capable of 
representation, an essential ingredient (he might plausibly claim) in sensory perception 
and thought. This response could also provide a deeper reason for his position on the 
second challenge.
In the Aristotelian psychology, the sensitive soul receives representations of things 
via “sensible species” that are transmitted through a medium. In vision, the quality of 
color (a “real quality”) is transmitted to the eye as a sensible species. Scholastic 
Aristotelians described sensible species as “intentional,” which meant, fi rst, that they 
have diminished being (an explication of Aristotle’s “forms without matter”: 1984: 674), 
and, second, that they represent the quality in the object.
Descartes assigned the ability to represent to mind, not to matter. Indeed, on one 
interpretation of his philosophy, representing is the very essence of mind (Hatfi eld 
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2003a: 259). If he indeed equated intellection with representing, then in saying that 
intellection is the essence of mind, he would also be saying that representation is its 
essence. This view accounts for consciousness by suggesting that, as representing 
powers, minds essentially represent (and so are conscious of) their own states (2:382; 
AT 7:559). If we further assume that the power to represent is essentially general – so 
that any being that can represent would be endowed not only with sensory representa-
tion but also with the ability to form general concepts – then we have an argument for 
Descartes’s much used premise that, if animals had souls, they would have reason or 
intellect.
This last assumption, concerning the generality of any representing power, may be 
too much to ask. One might well wonder why God couldn’t create lesser minds (3:304; 
AT 4:576), possessing only restricted powers of representation, lacking pure intellec-
tion and will, and having only sentience and sensory appetite (Pardies 1972). Or 
perhaps he could create animals that reason about particulars, but lack general con-
cepts and the ability to refl ect (La Chambre 1989), and so do not exhibit the general 
problem-solving ability that Descartes set as a criterion of mindedness. Indeed, Descartes 
himself allowed that faculties of intellect admit of differing degrees of perfection (2:40; 
AT 7:57). If forced to concede the metaphysical possibility of lesser animal minds, 
Descartes would have to fall back on his natural philosophical argument, that his soul-
less account of animal behavior is preferable for its parsimony (Newman 2001) and 
intelligibility. The question of animal sentience would then become a natural philo-
sophical problem, concerning whether Descartes’s purely mechanistic explanations of 
animal behavior are adequate, or whether notions such as representation and feeling 
are in fact required in any plausible account of animal behavior.
Are Descartes’s Animals Unfeeling Machines?
Although most of Descartes’s followers (Rosenfi eld 1968: Appendix, B–D) and most 
scholars read Descartes as denying sentience to animals, a minority argues that he 
ascribes limited mental properties to them (Vartanian 1953: 210–12), making them 
sentient but not (refl ectively) conscious (Cottingham 1998). These scholars appeal to 
textual evidence, and some additionally argue that Descartes needs to invoke intention-
ality in order to successfully explain the behavioral capacities of animals (Gaukroger 
2002: 201, 203).
In a letter of 1649 to the English philosopher Henry More, Descartes refi nes his 
earlier, unequivocal stance (3:148; AT 3:85) that animals have no feeling. He now 
indicates that it is impossible to prove that animals either do or do not have feelings, 
“since the human mind does not reach into their hearts” (3:365; AT 5:277). Forgoing 
certainty, he regards the denial of sentience as the “most probable” conclusion, a posi-
tion that is consistent with a retreat to natural philosophical (as opposed to meta-
physical) arguments.
Scholars who say that Descartes actually granted feeling to animals point especially 
to two passages. The fi rst is his letter of 1646 to the Marquess of Newcastle, in which 
he speaks of animals expressing “the hope of eating” and “their fear, their hope, or their 
joy” (3:303; AT 4:574). Here, Descartes has animals “expressing” their emotions or 
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passions. This way of speaking is also found in the Treatise, in which Descartes mentions 
the “passions” of the animal body in the absence of mind. (In the Treatise, Descartes’s 
descriptions apply to animal behavior as well as to human behavior that occurs without 
thought: 2:161, AT 7:229–30; 3:149; AT 3:122.) Indeed, in a letter from 1638, he 
had warned that people mistakenly infer that animals have “feelings and passions like 
ours” because animals behave similarly to how we behave when we have feelings. In 
his view, the correct view is that animals still are “automatons” without “any real 
feeling or emotion in them,” but that their outward behavior nonetheless resembles 
ours (3:99–100; AT 2:39–41). This position lets us easily interpret the letter to the 
Marquess as attributing to animals only corporeal counterparts to the passions: internal 
states that explain animal behavior but that do not involve genuine feeling.
The second passage occurs in the letter to More, in which Descartes denies that 
animals have sensation and thought “like us” (3:365–6; AT 5:277). After giving 
various arguments to show that this conclusion is the most plausible on the evidence, 
Descartes continues:
Please note that I am speaking of thought, and not of life or sensation. I do not deny life 
to animals, since I regard it as consisting simply in the heat of the heart; and I do not even 
deny sensation, insofar as it depends on a bodily organ. Thus my opinion is not so much 
cruel to animals as indulgent to human beings – at least to those who are not given to the 
superstitions of Pythagoras – since it absolves them from the suspicion of crime when they 
kill or eat animals. (3:366; AT 5:278–9)
Several points deserve attention. First, the Latin term here translated as “sensation” is 
sensus, which may mean simply the faculty of sense. Accordingly, the term need imply 
only that animals have sense organs that guide them when stimulated, leaving open 
how that function is carried out, whether by sentience or by unfeeling mechanisms. 
Second, the qualifi cation “insofar as it depends on a bodily organ” suggests that 
Descartes here allows animals a faculty of sense in just this mechanistic manner. Third, 
it is diffi cult to understand Descartes’s fi nal sentence about killing and eating animals 
if we suppose that he allows them genuine sentience. It seems plausible that Descartes 
means to alleviate human concerns about killing and eating sentient beings by indicat-
ing that animals aren’t really sentient after all. On the alternative reading, he would 
be saying that animals are sentient but not refl ective, which doesn’t provide much 
comfort to those concerned with animal pain. In the end, the passage can easily be 
assimilated to the other places in which Descartes describes purely material, unfeeling 
sensory processes in animal bodies as performing many of the guidance functions that 
conscious sensation performs in human beings (e.g., 2:161–2; AT 7:229–31; 3:148; 
AT 3:85).
The other strategy for arguing that Descartes assigned sentience to animals appeals 
to the explanatory resources that he may seem to need (according to present-day lights, 
at least) in order to explain the behavioral capacities of animals. Gaukroger contends 
that, since Descartes assigns discriminative sensory responses to animals (they respond 
appropriately to differing environmental stimuli), he must also attribute to them the 
ability to “process information,” which means that they must “interpret stimuli” and 
form “representations” (Gaukroger 2002: 203). This reconstruction relies on intuitions 
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about what is needed “to explain animal cognition, not explain it away” (p. 200). It 
renders animals as “sentient but non-conscious automata” (p. 203). Animals are sen-
tient in virtue of representing and interpreting stimuli; non-conscious because, lacking 
a mind, they lack human rational capacities for refl ection; and they are automata 
because their sentient states are actualized in a mechanistically conceived material 
body that lacks an immaterial mind.
My alternative reading is that Descartes restricts genuine representation and cogni-
tion to human beings, in virtue of their exclusive possession of minds. Descartes explains 
the apparent phenomena of animal cognition by appeal to non-intentional, mechanis-
tic processes. On this view, he interprets the processes in animal sensory systems as 
complex material causes. The retinal image and the counterpart brain images (which 
Gaukroger sees as representations) are material patterns that enter into the blind asso-
ciative processes of material memory (Descartes 1998: 150–2; AT 11:177–9). Descartes 
“explains away” the Aristotelian’s attribution of genuine cognitive states to animals, 
but he still aims to explain the behavioral capacities of animals in non-cognitive fashion. 
I recommend this interpretation as the one most consistent with Descartes’s fi rm dis-
tinction between mind and matter.
Descartes’s Legacy
Descartes’s philosophy left a dual legacy regarding psychology and the theory of mind. 
Through the doctrine of mind-body dualism and the attendant unifi cation of mental 
phenomena as those within conscious awareness, his philosophy encouraged the 
notion of phenomenal access as a defi ning feature of the mental. Through the doctrine 
of the animal machine, it almost diametrically led to a materialistic conception of 
animal and then human psychology and was an ancestor of early twentieth-century 
behaviorism. Let us consider this second aspect fi rst.
Descartes’s doctrine of the animal machine was part of his larger naturalist cos-
mogony. Although the idea that the world developed out of particulate matter in 
motion had been broached by the ancient atomists, Descartes gave it real fl esh, in his 
World and in Parts Three and Four of the Principles. The natural development of the 
solar system and of the Earth’s geological features became an immediate object of 
debate and further research (Roger 1982). The natural development of living things 
out of the Earth was taken up and developed in the eighteenth century (Vartanian 
1953: 273–88). Hume, citing the Epicurean (hence Lucretian) cosmogony, contended 
that a process equivalent to ends-selection could explain the “uses of the parts” of plants 
and animals and the apparent “adjustment of means to ends” of those parts (Hume 
1977: 184–5). Whether or not Descartes was aware of (or would have chosen) ends-
selection as an explanation for the functional unity of organisms, later authors were 
(and did). Eventually, Darwin argued convincingly that natural selection can explain 
the adaptedness of organisms. Even so, the proper interpretation of immanent teleology 
in contemporary descriptions of organic functions remains under discussion (Ariew, 
Cummins, and Perlman 2002).
Descartes’s conception of the animal machine was an important precursor to La 
Mettrie’s Man a Machine (1994), and to the materialism of Diderot and other French 
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philosophes (Vartanian 1953: 221–46). Thomas Willis (1971) prepared the way by 
asserting that purely material animals possessing a soul of fi ne matter could exhibit 
sentience, thereby rendering the animal machine sentient. La Mettrie and Diderot 
proposed that human beings might be wholly material entities that are conscious and 
rational. The materialistic claim that mental states can be reduced to (or perhaps iden-
tifi ed with) material states has subsequently gained adherents, although the topic 
remains under investigation. Substance dualism is now in demise, but the reason is not 
that materialists have shown how to explain consciousness and mental representation 
on their terms. Indeed, there is no currently accepted physical or material explanation 
of conscious sensation, mental representation, or conceptual thought. Whether there 
can and will be such an explanation is under dispute, and will remain so until such a 
time (if ever) that the mind-brain problem is solved.
Descartes’s dualism started yet another thread in the history of psychology. Many 
eighteenth-century investigators of sensory perception adopted a kind of “empirical 
dualism” of mental and physical phenomena, leaving the metaphysics of mental sub-
stance aside (Hatfi eld 1995). They were inspired by Descartes’s example that the psy-
chological processes of depth perception might be explained by taking both physiology 
and mentalistic psychology into account. His conception that the mind-body union is 
explanatorily relevant to sensory perception encouraged investigators to search for 
empirically based descriptions of mind-brain relations (Hatfi eld 2000).
The merging of these two streams in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to 
further questions about the defi nition of the mental and the adequacy of non-
mentalistic psychology. The behaviorists J. B. Watson and B. F. Skinner sought non-
mental explanations of all animal and human behavior. E. C. Tolman challenged this 
project from within, as did Gestalt psychology and subsequent perceptual and cognitive 
psychology from without (O’Neil 1982: ch. 9). At the same time, physiological psy-
chologists were referring to Descartes’s animal machine and concluding that con-
sciousness is not a necessary concomitant of all psychological capacities, including 
habit formation and the sensory processes that precede conscious sensory experience 
(Huxley 1884). One model treated the underlying processes as refl exive and mechanis-
tic, echoing Descartes’s animal machine. Another view suggested that non-conscious 
processes might nonetheless be mental, that is, they might include representational 
content that was combined according to innate or learned psychological mechanisms 
(Hatfi eld 2003b). Representation is here divorced from consciousness.
Morally, we can ask whether Descartes’s animal-machine hypothesis left a legacy 
of cruelty toward animals. His follower Malebranche is said to have been indifferent to 
the squeals of animal pain that he induced by kicking a pregnant dog while remarking 
that animals are insentient machines (Rosenfi eld 1968: 70). Some Cartesians used 
Augustine’s theological fi nding that an innocent newborn is undeserving of pain and 
suffering to support the animal-machine hypothesis. Owing to the Fall of humankind, 
human infants are not innocent and so their pain is just. Since other animals are born 
innocent, they do not deserve to suffer, hence they are insentient and don’t suffer 
(Rosenfi eld 1968: 47).
Descartes himself had a dog (AT 5:133), but this fact provides no grounds for sug-
gesting that he didn’t really believe that dogs lack feeling. In the decades following 
Descartes’s death, the most compelling argument for the sentience of animals was one 
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he raised and rejected (2:162; AT 7:231; 3:99; AT 2:39): their organs are analogous 
to ours, and we are sentient (Pardies 1972).
If we accept that Descartes’s animal-machine hypothesis is understandable given 
his other philosophical commitments, we can nonetheless fi nd implausible his view 
that animals lack feeling and basic cognition. That fi nding is consistent with the 
conclusion that the hypothesis was part of an intellectual program that spurred 
further growth in philosophy and psychology. Even as the tenets of that program have 
been progressively abandoned, the questions and problems that it raised remain in 
play.
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